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The Nature of the Corporation as a Legal Entity, with Especial Reference to the
law of Maryland. By James Treat Carter. Baltimore, M. Curlander, Iig.
pp. xv, 239.
Dr. Carter's book contains a justification from the practical viewpoint
for theoretical study of his subject; a brief historical sketch of corporate devel-
opment; a discussion of existing theories on corporate nature, in which he
reaches the conclusion that there is a real corporate entity; an examination of
constitutional liw cases on the corporation as a "citizen" and as a "person," in
which he indicates rather strikingly the difficulties and inconsistencies of the
ruling fiction theory; an admirable discussion of cases "disregarding the corpor-
ate entity," particularly those cases involving attempted use of the corporation
as a device for concealment of assets and other illegal ends; and an appended
special study of the law of Maryland.
The book is interesting and valuable. Its interest and its value do not,
however, lie primarily in the contributions of the author to his subject either as
a critic or as an independent thinker. In the field of constitutional law he largely
follows and relies on Henderson's able study; in the more theoretical side of
the work he relies largely on second-hand material when dealing with the
Continental thinkers, takes his jurisprudence wholesale and without criticism
from Gray, and writes nothing of his own to compare with the passage which
he quotes from Freund (p. 72); even the excellent discussion of the cases
involving illegal use of the corporation brings out no conclusions not reached
independently by other students.
For all that, Dr. Carter's book is interesting and valuable. It presents for
study a cross section in the development of the legal thought of a thinking man.
It is a product of hard study, of an earnest attempt to break through incrusta-
tions of word and formula and fiction to the law-truths beneath. In his persis-
tent attempt to analyze and isolate the varied and shifting concepts lying under
a single label ("fiction theory," p. 8o; "residence," p. 1o4; "public," p. x8);
in his attitude toward the growth of law (p. 89; but cf. p. 43) ; in his insistence
that a court's real justification be studied, and be made an articulate part of the
reasoning of an opinion (passim, e.g. 14); in his recurring perception that
facts exist independent of legal rules about them (pp. I, 58, 72, io2) and must
in thought and discussion be distinguished-in all these matters Dr. Carter
shows insight into and appreciation of that practical jurisprudence which is the
goal of modern legal teaching; and some portions of his book show considerable
skill in applying that jurisprudence in a very practical way.
Yet no man can quickly master a new system of thinking in all its applications.
Dr. Carter's thinking is not everywhere sustained; sometimes it lapses in vital
points in his discussion. His treatment of the doctrines of representation is
sadly inadequate when compared, for instance, to that of Seavey (Rationale
of Agency (i92o) 29 YALE LAw JOURNAt, 859) ; and the fauft in the foundation
mars his superstructure. And it is curious in a discussion of the reality of
corporate will, to find support sought in "the familiar doctrine of law by which
the intent, as distinct from the motive, will be presumed to exist." To this
reviewer, the author's theoretical discussion of the existence of a corporate entity
is at once the least and the most satisfactory portion of the book. The least,
because in that portion particularly the author fails to carry through consistently
principles of thinking in which other parts of the book prove him to be a real
believer; the most, because it is impossible to read that portion of the book
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with care without being forced into a definite position with regard to the subject-
matter the author is there treating. It would have helped materially had Dr.
Carter defined the "entity" under discussion as he does certain other chameleonic
terms. Omission to do that has led in the discussion to baffling shifts from
"corporation" as a group of people with a common interest, to "corporation"
as a creature of the law. That the group of stockholders is a reality within the
meaning of the term in normal human experience few men would deny; that
when they embark capital in common in a common enterprise they acquire a
new common interest with reference to which they are, within a reasonable
meaning of the term, an entity, in real existing fact: a thing to some extent
different from the sum of them severally, taken without the common interest-
this also is believed to link up with our experience. But the existence of the
group and of their common interest, and the desirability of machinery to enable
them to do business conveniently to advance their common interest-all of
which are facts-is in no wise to be confused with the machinery which the
law sets up to accommodate them in the matter. An organized society, acting
through its officers appointed to declare and administer its rules of life together,
says to the group of stock-holders: "With reference to this wealth you have
pooled, you may act as if you all together were a single individual distinct from
any of you; and you may act through agents, whose powers, for your protection,
must be given and exercised in a specified, orderly way." This is the creation
of legal machinery, and nothing more. Thereafter, to state that the acts of the
corporators or their agents, done in the prescribed fashion, have legal effect
largely as if done by a new, distinct person, is to state a truth; but to state that
there exists a new distinct person is to mistake a complex of legal rules for the
fact whose existence the rules merely simulate for the sake of uniformity with
the rules as to real persons. And if, instead of persons, we speak of entities,
we can nevertheless find no real entity in that legal machinery, nor does the
machinery create a separate corporate entity. What real entity there is, in
any normal meaning of the term, is the group of corporators (together, often,
with their agents, and the wealth they have pooled) and nothing more. Separate
from the individuals such entity may in some measure be, so far as men in a
group with a common interest may reach conclusions and do acts which they
would not do each alone. Such a hypothesis as this is believed to serve the
purposes a legal hypothesis should serve: it can explain the facts, all the facts,
of the decisions; its adoption in further decisions would force consideration
of the real issues, force a conscious compromise between the demands of actual
economic conditions and the requirements of precedent. If study and thought
over Dr. Carter's work leads men even to seek earnestly such a hypothesis-
whether it be the above or another-then Dr. Carter's work is good, whether
or not his own conclusions be accepted. K. N. LLEwmLyN.
Brooklyn, N. Y.
Problems of Law: Its Past, Present, and Future. By John H. Wigmore.
New York, Charles Scribner & Sons, i92o. pp. viii, 136. $1.50.
This volume comprises three lectures given by Dean Wigmore on the Barbour-
Page Lecture Foundation at the University of Virginia in ig2o. The lectures
are entitled "Problems of the Law's Evolution"; "Problems of the Law's
Mechanism in America"; "Problems of World Legislation-and America's Share
Therein."
The first lecture begins with an analysis of law, which the author separates
into its four essential elements, namely, A, "Human conduct relations"; B,
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"The formal element-Mode of affecting Conduct" by (a) "a uniform or regular
quality of behavior as contrasted with a variable or arbitrary sequence of acts";
(b) "by compulsion as contrasted with purely voluntary behavior"; and (c)
"by state power giving the force in this compulsion as contrasted with social
opinion,"
The author then passes to a consideration of the fundamental elements of
legal evolution. He reaches the conclusion that legal evolution implies (a)
movement, although not necessarily progress; (b) that this movement is a
variable, not a constant; (c) that there is no universal formula which can
describe the process of legal evolution.
This form of statement of the essential elements in law is unfamiliar, not to
say puzzling, until the reader discovers that the author is only presenting in
somewhat unusual form the generally accepted notion that law deals with human
conduct, that it selects only certain essential facts as a basis for the application
of its rules and thus gives to those rules uniformity and generality, and finally
that law has state sanction.
After some reference to the attempts of various philosophers to give a
graphic or geometrical description of legal evolution, the author advances the
novel suggestion that the most complete analogy to the forces of legal evolution
is furnished by the planetary system with its numerous local interdependent
motions.
He then proceeds to illustrate the applicability of this analogy in elaborate detail
by reference to the principles of physics which are exemplified in the gyroscope.
That the evolution of our legal system has involved movement or change;
that this change has not been constant and that our legal system is a resultant
of an extremely complex combination of social forces, is familiar learning to
the student of law. -The author's analysis, therefore, does not carry us very
far toward a better understanding of the intricate problems of legal evolution.
Nor will the students be encouraged by it to seek their solution in a more
extended investigation of either the gyroscope or the solar system. The author,
however, does place a very proper emphasis on the fact, which both students
and teachers of law are prone to under-emphasize, that the study of the substan-
tial elements of law begins always with social facts and institutions and that
legal evolution is virtually inseparable from the evolution of social habits.
This lecture makes some interesting suggestions as to the method to be
adopted in order to secure scientific results from an investigation of legal evolu-
tion.
"Any rigidly scientific results must be based on at least the following elements:
Taking a single idea or institution, its forms must be traced (i) in two or more
successive epochs for the same communities; (2) then in two or more communi-
ties in successive epochs; (3) then the other legal institutions in the same
communities and epochs must be mapped out, so that the connection if any may
be disclosed; (4) then the main social forces in the same communities and
epochs must also be mapped out, so as further to detect the possible causes of
difference; (5) the whole must be conceived of as a simultaneous movement of
forces" (p. 5i).
It is admitted that what is here proposed is an ideal to be looked forward to
and that its realization is as yet impracticable for lack of adequate data. The
author's application of this method to a study of the form of declaring law and
the organs for declaring law tends to encourage the doubt whether the rigid
application of this method will result in formulating any scientific law of legal
evolution of general application other than that law is the resultant of social
forces and that its evolution will be materially influenced by social evolution.
The second lecture deals with the problems of law-making by legislation and
by judicial decision, and raises the very pertinent question from the viewpoint
of legal analysis and philosophy why the judge in administering law should be
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bound either by legislation or by precedent. He also deals with the related
questions, why the legislator in enacting legislation should attempt to go intodetails and how far legislation should attempt to provide for future change of
conditions. Of course the answer to the last two questions must necessarilydepend upon the power to be given to the judicial officer to modify or extend
the operation of statutes. A perfect case can be made out in legal theory-asindeed the author does make it out-for conferring upon the judiciary as a body
of large experts the authority to limit or, disregard both precedent and legislation.That the modification of established legal doctrine by judges would be more
scientific, more thoroughly considered and would produce more just results than
modification of law by legislators who are not expert and who do not give tolegislative problems the study and careful consideration given to legal problemsby judges, is not open to doubt. If such power were to be conferred uponjudges, many other interesting questions which are not discussed are suggestedby the author's proposal, such for example as the desirability of giving power tothe judges to limit the ex- post facto effect of judicial decisions overturningprecedent or admittedly amending statutes by interpretation and the method by
which such limitation would be accomplished.
Interesting as are the questions raised by this lecture, one cannot recall thehistory of legislation and constitutional amendment in the United States, limitingthe powers of judges and tending to subject them more and more to popular
control, without realizing that they are purely speculative questions and are likelyto remain so for a long time to come. There is no indication to be discoveredin American history for a least a hundred years past that the people will everbe willing to confer upon judges whose tenure of office is sufficiently long to
ensure their being a body of experts, the power of legislation as that term is
applied to the functions of legislative bodies. If their tenure of office wereshortened so as to bring the judges under practically the immediate control of thepeople by popular elections at frequent intervals, as are our legislators, it canhai;dly be supposed that judges would be more expert than legislators or moredevoted to the scientific development of law than are legislators.
Moreover such a proposal, while emphasizing and expanding the law-makingpower of the courts, leaves out of account their primary function of settling with
reasonable expedition the rights of private litigants. Litigation is now a
sufficiently formidable undertaking to give one pause before resorting to itBut if the prospective litigant were to contemplate thenecessity of adequatelydebating, for the public good, the question whether a given statute should or
should not be modified by judicial decision and whether such amendment shouldbe applied ex post facto to him, he might well be filled with dismay. It is notintended by this suggestion to deny that a frank recognition of the fact thatjudges do make law is desirable or that some enlargement of that power as itis habitually exercised would improve our law. It is only intended to point outsome of the grave difficulties which would attend any such radical and sweeping
change of the judicial function as that proposed; difficulties so great that the
attempt to overcome them would not only endanger our judicial system, but tendto destroy the certainty and generality which the author regards as essential
elements of law.
It would be an interesting and it is believed a desirable experiment to confer
upon the court of last resort in a given jurisdiction express statutory or constitu-tional power to modify or limit its own precedents and the power in its discretion
also to limit the ex post facto operation of such decisions. If such power weregiven and its exercise encouraged by constitutional or legislative enactment,
there can be but little doubt that it would tend to remove from our common law
many of the anachronisms which tend to work injustice and which experiencehas taught it is extremely difficult to cancel in satisfactory manner by legislation.
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The last lecture deals with -the subject of securing uniform legislation by the
co-operation of the states with foreign governments. A stumbling block to such
co-operation is found in the fact that Congress has no constitutional power to
adopt uniform legislation relating to those subjects which are within the
reserved powers of the states. On the other hand, under Article I, section io
of the Constitution, the several states have no power to enter into agreements or
compacts with foreign states. The remedy suggested is that this power be
conferred upon them pursuant to Article I, section io by consent of Congress.
The recommendation is that Congress could by i general law give its consent
in advance that a state may make a compact with one or more foreign powers
upon a specified subject of law. That duly accredited delegates of the states
be sent to attend conferences with the representatives of foreign powers, that
such conferences adopt drafts of proposed uniform laws, that when adopted the
delegates present the drafts to their several states for adoption, and that thus
uniform legislation will be secured.
Anent this proposal two suggestions may be made. The states of the United
States are now forbidden by constitutional enactment to enter into compacts
with each other without the consent of Congress. Nevertheless it has been
found possible to secure uniform legislation which has been widely adopted
throughout the United States by the simple process of appointing delegates
to attend a conference on uniform laws. It has not been found necessary that
the states should enter into compacts for the enactment of these laws or that
the states should appoint duly accredited diplomatic representatives to accom-
plish this purpose. The adoption of the proposed uniform laws by the confer-
ence and the recommendation that it be enacted into law by the several states
have been found sufficient to secure the general adoption of the more important
laws proposed by the conference. No reason is apparent why, if there were
any desire to secure such legislation the several states could not appoint delegates
to meet in conference with the delegates of foreign nations to recommend uniform
legislation for hdoption by the states and by the foreign countries concerned
precisely as is now done by the conference on uniform laws.
On the other hand, the proposal to confer upon the separate states the power
to enter into compacts with foreign governments raises a most serious question
with respect to the diplomatic relations of the United States with foreign coun-
tries. During the entire history of the country there has been no exercise by a
state of the power tb enter into a compact with any foreign nation, because,
it is believed, it has been clearly perceived that such an exercise of power by
the individual states would be inherently subversive of national unity and because
it would tend to create the impression abroad of a fundamental weakness in the
federal government to conduct its foreign affairs. The importance of preserving
unimpaired the complete control of all international relations by the national
government would appear to be of far greater importance than any legislation
which might be secured through the power of individual states to exercise the
treaty-making power. Once embarked on such a policy it would be difficult to
say where we should end, and what subjects might be deemed to be within the
permitted authority to agree upon uniform legislation. The presence of the
diplomatic representatives of the foreign governments at the capitals of our
several states, intent upon securing compacts with'the states, would not tend to
give unity or dignity to our foreign relations, which must necessarily be under
the direction and control of the central government, if we are to preserve its
integrity and authority is a truly national government. We doubt whether this
proposal will commend itself to Congress. Nor is it believed that there is any
solid ground for urging it until a serious effort has been made to secure uniform
legislation by the conference method.
By these lectures Dean Wigmore will, as always, stimulate thought and provoke
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discussion. It is fortunate for the legal profession and for the future develop-
ment of the law that we have men like him, fertile of suggestion, and of inquiring
mind, to question things as they are, to shake conservatism and stimulate the
desire for a better knowledge of our legal system and for its improvement
Caution and conservatism may raise objections to the particular method proposed,
but such objections, if valid, will only encourage the proposal of better and more
effective methods. A more thorough understanding of legal evolution, better
methods of securing modification of law, and the facilitating of uniform legisla-
tion are greatly to be desired. We are indebted to Dean Wigmore for having
stimulated the desire and opened the discussion of these important questions.
HARLAN F. STONE
Columbia Law School.
1921 Supplement to Federal Income and Profits Taxes. By George E. Holmes.
Indianapolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Co. I92z. pp. xxiv, 539.
Federal income tax law is developing so rapidly that although Mr. Holmes'
valuable treatise on the subject appeared only in 1g2o [see review in 1920 (3o
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 104) ] it is necessary to issue this sizable volume in order to
bring the subject down to date. In the main the additions are only of new
authorities, but the chapter-on War Profits and Excess Profits Tax has been
entirely re-written, and has undergone a sixty-five per cent expansion in the
re-writing. The additional information thus presented on this labyrinthine
subject is very valuable. Another particularly commendable feature of this
volume is the complete system of references to the authorities of the govern-
ment's own revenue system, which have appeared in the federal Income Tax
Bulletin Service, such as Solicitor's Opinions, Advisory Tax Board Recommen-
dations, Committee on Appeals and Revenue Recommendations and Office
Decisions. To all those who have to deal with federal income tax matters, aid
of the careful, comprehensive and painstaking character of these two volumes by
Mr. Holmes is a necessity. C. E. C.
The Relation of the Judiciary to, the Constitution. By William M. Meigs.
New York, The Neale Publishing Company, 192o. pp. 248. $2.oo.
Thirty-five years ago Mr. Meigs made a pioneer excursion into the antecedents
of the American doctrine of judicial review. Others have since followed the
trail that he blazed, and now he in turn sums up for us the results of their
explorations. His primary motive is that of the propagandist As he tells us
in the Introduction: "There is the gravest danger that this noisy minority will
lead the country . . . to launch out upon evil ways. . . . It is the conviction
of this danger that has led me once more to take up the subject of Judicial Power"
(p. io). This fear helps to explain the author's sermonizing and his frequent
blurring of the distinction between precedents for judicial review of the acts of
a co-ordinate legislature, and those which merely illustrate the control of central
and superior authorities over subordinate local agencies. Not that Mr. Meigs
does not perceive the distinction. He refers to it every now and then. Yet
often his zeal leads him to fight in favor of the Supreme Court's control over
Acts of Congress with weapons that have point only in favor of that. tribunal's
control over state statutes alleged to conflict with the federal Constitution. For
logical analysis, readers should turn from Mr. Meigs to the more closely-reasoned
essays of Mr. Corwin and of Mr. McLaughlin.
Analytical shortcomings should not blind us to the convenience of having the
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fruits of historical research gathered and arranged in this volume. So few are
familiar with the scholarly study of Dr. Elmer B. Russell on The Review of
American Colonial Legislation by the King in Council and with Professor
Schlesinger's valuable contributions to the POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY on
Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council that Mr. Meigs has done a genuine service
in summarizing their discoveries. His thesis that the treatment of his subject
should "be altogether historical in method" affords some possible justification
for his attention to precedents that give logical or legal support only to that part
of our judicial review which already has abundant warrant in the language of
the Constitution itself. It has never been thought a usurpation for courts to
declare state statutes void because of conflict with the federal Constitution.
This instrument declares that it shall be the supreme law of the land and that the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby. It is an easy inference that
alleged conflicts between this Constitution and state laws raise issues to which
the federal judicial power extends. This is the present-day counterpart of the
review over colonial legislation exercised by British tribunals. For precedents
in support of judicial review over statutes of a co-ordinate legislature we should
have to find courts in England assuming to annul Acts of Parliament. Coke's
effort in this direction was nipped in the bud, and that doughty old champion
of the common law had to crawl abjectly from his position. Coke's presumption,
as Mr. Meigs shows, was repeated by those New England revolutionary leaders
who appealed from Acts of Parliament to something higher. They had a prece-
dent for their thoughts if not for their practices. Moreover, one form of
judicial review naturally breeds others. The practice of imperial review of
colonial legislation is an historical antecedent of more than its precise analogue
on this side of the Atlantic. This is to say something more or something less
than that it was an historical antecedent of everything that has happened
since. Mr. Meigs, however, is far from careful to confine himself to this special
something more or something less. His carelessness in this respect shows the
limitations of his "historical method," for which he hardly makes amends by
his infusion of not a little of the hortatory method.
Mr. Meigs does not appear to venture any direct refutation of the charge
that Marbury v. Madison was a judicial usurpation in the sense of an assumption
of judicial power not explicitly granted by the Constitution. The idea is anath-
ema to him, but he meets it only by the appeal to history, which at best can
place such usurpation somewhat further in the past. There is an unconscious
confession in the comment on the Supreme Court decisions prior to i8oo:
"In no one of these was there a decision of the point; but in all language was
used which shows how the doctrine was spreading and being accepted by the
bench; evidence will be found, too, that the bar as well was coming to be
saturated with the same belief, and was beginning to use the new weapon in
their pleadings, and in general, as a means of protecting their clients" (p. 187).
A "new weapon" this was, forged not by the Constitution but by history. The
chief significance of Marbury v. Madison is that it "stood out as the culmination
of a long and gradual growth" (p. 201). This is to say that judicial review
came to be because it came to be. Its sanction then is extra-constitutional.
Those who think of the Constitution as a parchment and nothing but a parchment
can not answer the charge of judicial usurpation.' But those who understand
the extent to which in a sense all government is a government of men and not
of laws will recognize readily that the legitimate sanctions of governmental
devices are by no means confined to formal enactments of constitutional conven-
tions. Things start because our governors start them. For much of the law
that men live by, the best of sanctions is wide-spread and long-continued acquies-
cence.
THOMAS REM PowELL.Columbia University.
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1g21 Supplement, to Barnes' Federal Code. Edited by Uriah Barnes. Indian-
apolis, The Bobbs-Merrill Co., I92o. pp. xxiii, 503. $5.o.
So momentous was the mass of federal legislation enacted during the years ix9g
and 592o that the necessity for an early compilation of these statutes was soon
recognized. The result was the publication of this Supplement- to Barnes'Federal Code less than two years after the original work.appeared. The Codeitself represents an eminently successful attempt to combine in a single, handy
volume all the existing federal statutes. down through the year 1918. The official
sources of the federal laws are appallingly scattered and unsystematized: thefirst edition in 1875 of the Revised Statutes, the second edition 'in i878 (by Act
of Congress legal evidence of the laws therein contained), and the supplementsin i8g1 and i9oi constitute the only official compilations. For the federal laws
enacted since igoi reference must be had to the Statutes at Large, the SessionLaws, and the Slip Laws. Consequently, it can readily be seen that a complete
manual of the federal laws such as Barnfs' Code was highly welcome to thelegal profession. Careful, logical, well-executed classification of the law accord-ing to subject-matter, enhanced by a comprehensive general index, gives Barnes'Code a value which is widely recognized. The Supplement follows closely theplan of the original work, having the characteristic parallel reference tables,
and a clear, accurate index. The federal legislation of the period covered bythe Supplement dealing as it does with taxation, prohibition, transportation,
trade, commerce, and a multitude of other matters, is so broad in scope that theSupplement, or a similar volume, would seem to be well nigh indispensable to
every active attorney. A. H. F.
The Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers. By Jesse S.Robinson. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, t92o. pp. viii, 166.
This volume is one of a series of excellent studies in the history, organization
and practice of American trade unionism published under the direction of theDepartment of Political Economy in Johns Hopkins University. ProfessorRobinson selects for intensive study the experience of union labor in a greatindustry where, despite bitter struggle, the efforts to organize the workers havelargely failed. He traces the history of the Amalgamated Association from its
organization in 1876, back -to the origins of the yaribus craft unions of which it
was composed, and forward through its stormy career to the year 1916. The
strength of the union has, on' the whole, declined; the reasons for this decline
and the effect of strikes and other labor struggles upon the union's membership
are disclosed in the narrative.
The best part of the monograph is. its study of union policy. Aside from itsbenefit features, a strictly non-economic program described in detail by the
writer, the union's activities have been devoted -primarily to obtaining for its
members "a fair remuneration for their labor." This has given rise to a group
of policies, some justified on economic grounds, other anti-sociial in their effects,
whose key-stone is the Standard Rate. Difficult to establish in these industriesbecause of the piece-work basis of pay and the widely varying local conditions,
the standard rate .-has been consistently demanded in the trade agreements ofthe union and, to a large degree, demanded successfully. The concept of a fair
remuneration implies a definitioi of the working day; the union has been
continuously successful in its efforts to shorten the hours of labor in thig industry,formerly notorious for its excessively long workday. These gains, justified inthemselves, have been won by means worthy of praise, by bargain rather than by
violence. But the Association has not been free from policies of a natureinjurious to social welfare; restriction of output, opposition to labor-saving
machinery and, to a smaller extent, monopolistic limitation of membership-
BOOK REVIEWS
policies familiarly known as the fallacies of unionism-have received the sanc-
tion of the Association or of its member unions. These are described as fully
and dispassionately as are the more creditable elements of the union's program.
A thorough study of the much disputed weapon of collective bargaining concludes
the volume.
On the whole the monograph merits praise. The presentation is descriptive
and factual rather than interpretative; the reader is left to draw his own conclu-
sions and to choose his own position in regard to the union movement. But




Liquor Prohibition. By Archibald Douglass Dabney. The Michie Co., Char-
lottesville, i920. pp. lvi, 477.
A legal historian will some day write his name on the tablets of fame by
tracing, with due regard to the social, economic, and political background, the
remarkable way in which prohibition became part of our organic law. He will
also show how far reaching was the effect of the 18th Amendment in rooting
up and casting aside settled principles of law deemed to mark the frontier
beyond which government might not go in taking private property or in ordering
the habits of citizens.
The author of Liquor Prohibition, however, narrows the scope of his work to
a mere collation of decisions construing prohibition statutes arranged as logi-
cally as possible, with reference to the National Prohibition Act (commonly
known as the Volstead Act), which was enacted for the purpose of enforcing
under Title I, War Time Prohibition, and under Title II, the x8th Amendment.
The author has taken the sections of the Act in sequence, and has cited such
cases under each as he deemed applicable and pertinent. He has not attempted
to analyze the statute or to group the provisions of the Act with regard to the
subject-matter of the sections and their inter-relations. The omission of any
reference to Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co. (Dec. 1, 1919) 25! U. S. 264,
4o Sup. Ct. 14!, or Ruppert v. Caffey (Jan. 5, ig2o) 251 U. S. 264, 40 Sup. Ct. 141,
is persuasive of the fact that the book was unduly hastened to completion.
The foregoing cases are decisive of many of the vital aspects of the Volstead
Act, and unless the practicing lawyer is familiar with them and with other
cases later decided, he cannot possibly have any adequate idea of the scope and
limitations of -the Act.
This lack is not made up by the copious citation of state decisions not perti-
nent to the Volstead Act, however helpful they might have been in dealing with
the statutes of the several states enacted prior thereto. The usefulness of the
book is futher impaired by the author's failure to include an analytical table of
contents. A collation of decided cases involves a critical comparison of the
cases, to the end that discrepancies or agreement may be disclosed and analyzed.
The omission of a proper table of contents compels the reader to rely solely
upon the index if he would find citations on subjects with which he must deal
in his practice or in his study of the law.
Here, too, the book seems defective. More than 2,000 cases are cited, and the
author has tried to refer to the subj'ect-matter to these cases in an index of less
than ten pages. It is noteworthy that in an index which deals with such heads
as Vinegar and Tickets, space was not found for Police Power, the proper
exercise of which, since time out of mind, has been the basis upon which the
vast bulk of prohibition legislation has been upheld by the courts.
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There are innumerable cases cited touching on questions the discussion of
which is not of any value in respect either of the Amendment or of the Volstead
Act. Why should space have been given to cases dealing with the effect of
serving liquor with meals, with definitions of a bar-room or of intoxicating
liquors or sales on credit, which questions are no longer pertinent because of the
express provisions of the Act itself?
It is hard to avoid the impression that the author has been content to 'compile
a large bulk.of decisions under state statutes, together with a negligible percent-
age of federal decisions and arrange them as well as he might under the provi-
sions of the Volstead Act. Prohibition is now being enforced almost wholly
under the Volstead Act, and the courts have held that all state statutes in conflict
are superseded by it. The practicing lawyer, therefore, can gain little from a
reference to cases decided by state courts construing state laws not now effective.
ARTHuR L. STRAssa.
New York, N. Y.
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A Treatise on the Law and Procedure of Receivers. By Henry G. Tardy'.
San Francisco, Bender-Moss Co., 1g2o. In Two Volumes. Vol. i, pp. xxxv,
1-1230; Vol. II, pp. 1231-2307.
The Financial Organization of Society. By Harold G. Moulton. Chicago, The
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